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Abstract
This paper compares Hilbert’s ε-terms and Russell’s approach to indefinite de-
scriptions, Russell’s indefinites for short. Despite the fact that both accounts are
usually taken to express indefinite descriptions, there is a number of dissimilar-
ities. Specifically, it can be shown that Russell indefinites—expressed in terms
of a logical ρ-operator—are not directly representable in terms of their corre-
sponding ε-terms. Nevertheless, there are two possible translations of Russell
indefinites into epsilon logic. The first one is given in a language with classical
ε-terms. The second translation is based on a refined account of epsilon terms,
namely indexed ε-terms. In what follows we briefly outline these approaches
both syntactically and semantically and discuss their respective connections; in
particular, we establish two equivalence results between the (indexed) epsilon
calculus and the proposed ρ-term approach to Russell’s indefinites.
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1 Introduction
In linguistics and philosophy of language, one generally distinguishes between two
ways to logically represent indefinite descriptions of the form
An A is a B.
The first approach goes back to Russell and views the expression “an A” as non-
referential. Indefinites of this form are taken to function semantically like existential
quantifiers (or variables bound by an existential quantifier). According to this quan-
tificational account, the logical form of the above sentence is best captured by the
following existentially quantified statement:
∃x(A(x) ∧B(x))
The second approach has roots in work by Hilbert and has recently been further
developed by von Heusinger and Egli.1 This is to view the expression “an A” as a
constant term that denotes a particular object. Specifically, an indefinite phrase so
understood can be presented logically by an epsilon term εxA(x). Informally speak-
ing, this term picks out an arbitrary object that satisfies formula A if such an object
exists. Accordingly, the indefinite description stated above is presented logically not
in terms of a quantified statement, but in terms of the following statement:2
B(εxA(x))
These two logical reconstructions of indefinite descriptions seem to be based on
two different ways to understand indefinites. Let us dub them Russell and Hilbert
indefinites. The central conceptual difference between them is usually taken to
be the fact that unlike Hilbert’s indefinites, Russell indefinites are not referring
expressions or terms with a fixed reference. Nevertheless, as we want to show in this
paper, there exists a natural way to represent Russell’s ambiguous descriptions in
terms of a logical language with a term-forming operator. Thus, in analogy to the
representation of free choice indefinites in an epsilon-term logic, we will outline here
a operator-based logic for the expression of Russel indefinites.
The central aim in this paper is to compare the representation of indefinites
in term of epsilon logic with a Russellian approach to indefinite descriptions in
terms of a logic based on a ρ-operator. As we will show, there is a number of dis-
similarities between the two accounts. Specifically, it can be shown that Russell’s
ambiguous descriptions—expressed in terms of a logical ρ-operator—are not directly
1See, in particular, [16] and [15]
2See [16] for a detailed discussion of both approaches and for further references.
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representable in terms of their corresponding ε-terms. Nevertheless, there are two
possible translations of Russell indefinites into epsilon logic. The first one is based
on an embedding of a language with ρ-terms into a classical language with ε-terms.
The second translation is based on a refined account of epsilon terms, namely in-
dexed ε-terms first introduced by von Heusinger.3 In what follows we briefly outline
these approaches to represent indefinites both syntactically and semantically and
discuss their respective connections; in particular, we establish two equivalence re-
sults between the classical and indexed epsilon calculus on the one hand and the
ρ-term approach to Russell’s account of indefinite descriptions on the other hand.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will introduce the extensional epsilon
calculus EC as well as a suitable choice semantics for (closed) epsilon terms. Section
3 will then present a logic for ρ-terms based on Russell’s remarks on indefinite
descriptions. Section 4 will then give a closer comparison between the two logical
representations of ambiguous descriptions. Specifically, we present a translation of
the ρ-term presentation of “An A is a B” in classical epsilon logic (4.1) as well as
in a language of indexed epsilon terms (4.2). Finally, section 5 will contain some
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2 Hilbert’s ε-terms
A natural logical representation of indefinites (or indefinite descriptions) can be
given in terms of epsilon terms, that is, terms formed with the help of an epsilon
operator.4 As understood by Hilbert, the ε-operator functions as a logical term-
forming operator: given a first-order formula A(x) with variable x occurring free
in it, εxA(x) is a closed term in which all occurrences of x are bound. Informally
speaking, this term refers to an arbitrary object satisfying the formula A if there
exists such an object.5
Different epsilon calculi have been proposed in the literature since Hilbert to
describe the logical behaviour of such terms. The extensional EC usually consists
of two axiom schemes (in addition to the standard axioms and deduction rules of
3See, in particular, [16] and [9].
4Epsilon terms were originally introduced in Hilbert’s proof-theoretic work on the foundations
of mathematics in the 1920s. See, in particular, [14] and [17] for detailed historical discussions of
the development of the epsilon calculus as well as of Hilbert’s epsilon substitution method in his
syntactic consistency proofs. Compare also [1] for a first systematic study of the epsilon calculus.
5The following discussion of epsilon logic follows closely the presentation given in [18]. See also
[13] for a similar discussion of epsilon terms and their choice semantics.
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first-order logic), namely
A(t)→ A(εxA(x)) (Critical formulas)
∀x(A(x)↔ B(x))→ εxA(x) = εxB(x) (Extensionality)
The second axiom expresses an extensionality principle for epsilon logic: if two
formulas are equivalent, then their respective ε-representatives are identical.6
Hilbert’s original motivation for the introduction of a calculus for epsilon terms
was to show that one can explicitly define the first-order quantifiers in terms of
epsilon terms in the following way:
∃xA(x) :↔ A(εxA(x)) (Def∃)
∀xA(x) :↔ A(εx¬A(x)) (Def∀)
It is a well known fact that first-order predicate logic is embeddable in EC. This
is based on a translation function (.)ε that maps expressions of the a first-order
language L to expressions of the language with epsilon-terms Lε (see [10]):
1. eε = e, for e a variable or constant symbol
2. P (t1, . . . , tn)ε = P (tε1, . . . , tεn)
3. f(t1, . . . , tn)ε = f(tε1, . . . , tεn)
4. (¬A)ε = ¬Aε
5. (A ∧B)ε = Aε ∧Bε
6. (A ∨B)ε = Aε ∨Bε
7. (∃x(A(x)))ε = Aε(εxA(x)ε)
8. (∀x(A(x)))ε = Aε(εx¬A(x)ε)
As a consequence of this, any first-order formula can be represented as a quantifier-
free formula in Lε, a result which was of central importance in Hilbert’s proof theo-
retic work, in particular, in his two ε-theorems.7
6It should be noted here that the extensionality axiom was already mentioned in Hilbert’s work,
but not used in the proofs of his famous epsilon theorems. The axiom is discussed again in Asser’s
study of the epsilon calculus [2] as well as in [6]. See [18] and [8] for modern presentations of
intensional and extensional epsilon calculi.
7Compare again [17] and [10] for further details.
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Turning to the semantic interpretation of (extensional) EC, we saw that epsilon
terms of the form εxA(x) were understood by Hilbert and subsequent logicians to
function as referring indefinite expressions, i.e. as terms that pick out any object
which satisfies the formula A(x) under the condition that there are such objects.
Compare, for instance, Hilbert & Bernays’ informal description of the semantic
interpretation of such terms in the second volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik
(1939):
Syntactically, [the ε-symbol] provides a function of a variable predicate,
which–besides the argument to which the variable bound by the ε-symbol
refers–may contain free variables as arguments (“parameters”). The
value of this function for a given predicate A (for fixed values of the
parameters) is an object of the universe for which–according to the se-
mantical translation of the formula (ε0)–the predicate A holds, provided
that A holds for any object of the universe at all. [5, p.12]
A natural model-theoretic formalization of this understanding of epsilon terms
is given today in terms of a choice-functional semantics. A choice semantics for
the extensional EC can be characterized as follows:8 an interpretation M of the
language Lε has the form 〈D, I〉 with D a domain and I an interpretation function
for the signature of Lε. We further hold that s : V ar → D is an assignment function
on M. The ε-operator is interpreted by an extensional choice function of the form
δ : ℘(D)→ D such that, for any X ⊆ D:
δ(X) =
{
x ∈ X, if X 6= ∅;
x ∈ D otherwise.
Such a choice function assigns a “representative” object to any non-empty subset of
D. It gives an arbitrary object from domain D in case the set X is empty.
Based on this notion of extensional choice functions, one can give a choice-
functional semantics for EC. Valuation rules for terms of Lε not containing epsilon
terms are specified as for standard first-order logic. In addition, the semantic eval-
uation of ε-terms is specified relative to a structure M, assignment function s, and
a choice function δ on M based on the following valuation rule:9
valM,δ,s(εxA(x)) = δ({d ∈ D |M, s[x/d] |= A(x)}).
8Early formulations of a choice-functional semantics for the epsilon calculus were given in [2]
and in [6]. See also [8] and [18] for modern presentations of a choice semantics for extensional EC.
Both [6] and [18] contain a proof of the completeness of EC with respect to this semantics.
9The following rule applies only to closed epsilon terms. For a more comprehensive discussion
of the semantics of extensional and intensional epsilon logics, including valuation rules for open
epsilon terms see [8].
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The semantic value of a given term εxA(x) is thus the object that the choice function
δ picks out from the truth-set of formula A. If the set defined by A is empty, then
δ picks out any object in D otherwise. Based on this, the semantic notions of
satisfaction of formulas of Lε can then be specified in the usual way and in direct
analogy with first-order logic.
This choice-functional semantics for EC can be seen as a way to make precise
the particular indefinite character of epsilon terms. As is argued in [13], the reason
to view such terms as indefinites lies precisely in their semantic character, more
specifically, in the kind of “arbitrary reference” usually associated with such terms.
This mode of reference (typical also for instantial terms in logic and mathematical
reasoning) has recently been described by Magidor and Breckenridge in the following
way:
Arbitrary Reference (AR): It is possible to fix the reference of an ex-
pression arbitrarily. When we do so, the expression receives its ordinary
kind of semantic-value, though we do not and cannot know which value
in particular it receives. [3, p.378]
This kind of undetermined reference is also characterstic for Hilbert’s understanding
of epsilon terms as indefinite expressions. Thus, in Hilbert’s account of indefinite
phrases, indefiniteness is explained best in the sense that such phrases refer arbi-
trarily to objects. Moreover, one can view the valuation rule for ε-terms stated
above as a way to make precise this very notion of arbitrary reference. We can thus
paraphrase the epsilon-term representation B(εx(A(x)) of the indefinite description
stated in the introduction as “An arbitrary A is a B.” With this in mind, let us now
turn to Russell’s account of indefinite descriptions.
3 Russell ρ-terms
We want to motivate our presentation of Russell’s account of indefinite descriptions
with the following quote:
The definition is as follows: The statement that an object having the
property φ has the property ψ means: The joint assertion of φx and ψx
is not always false. So far as logic goes, this is the same proposition
as might be expressed by some φ′s are ψ′s; but rhetorically there is a
difference, because in the one case there is a suggestion of singularity,
and in the other case of plurality. [12, p.171]
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Given this quote, an ambiguous description in this sense is the occurrence of an
indefinite phrase “an A” in a context B, viz. “an A is a B”.10 As we saw in the
Introduction, the standard formalization of this in first-order logic is:
∃x(A(x) ∧B(x))
where both A and B are unary predicates or formulas.11 Russell’s indefinites can
alternatively be expressed in terms of a term-forming operator that is in several
ways similar to Hilbert’s ε-operator. For a given formula A with x occurring free in
it, let ρxA(x) be a term standing for “an x, such that x has A”. This ρ-operator can
then be defined in the following way (relative to some context):12
B(ρxA(x)) :↔ ∃x(A(x) ∧B(x)) (Def ρ)
In this paper, we assume that for Russell indefinite descriptions can function (at
least on the surface) as singular terms – as the following quote shows:
The identity in ‘Socrates is a man’ is identity between an object named
(accepting ‘Socrates’ as a name, subject to qualifications explained later)
and an object ambiguously described. [12, p.172]
Again, nowadays we are more inclined to view a sentence as ‘Socrates is a man’
as an atomic sentence in which ‘is a man’ is predicated from (a singular term)
‘Socrates’.
With respect to (Def ρ) Russell’s famous theory of definite description can be
seen as an extension of his account of indefinite descriptions by adding a unique-
ness condition to the existential condition already present in (Def ρ). A contextual
definition of an indefinite description can also be constructed from the definite de-
scription “the A is a B”, expressed by ∃x(A(x)∧∀y(A(y)→ x = y)∧B(x)), simply
by dropping the uniqueness clause.13
For reasons belonging to Russell’s particular approach to proper names, neither
definite nor indefinite descriptions belong to the class of proper singular terms.
10For a closer discussion of the relation between ambiguous and definite descriptions, see also
Russell’s classical paper [12].
11A problem with this existential reading of indefinite descriptions in the formalization of natural
language discourse is that A(x) and B(x) are treated symmetrically in ∃x(A(x) ∧ B(x)). In the
natural language sentence above, this is not necessarily the case. We would like to thank one of the
reviewers for bringing this point to our attention.
12It should noted here that this operator-based interpretation of indefinite descriptions was not
given by Russel himself, but has been developed by the second author of the present article.
13Compare Russell’s own presentation of his theory of descriptions in [11].
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Instead, his stance on both types of descriptions is that they are incomplete symbols,
i.e. that the meaning of the (in)definite description is constituted by some context.
In analogy to Russell’s considerations for definite descriptions ρ-terms are not
given a direct interpretation; rather these terms are interpreted in a contextual
way, or are defined contextually. If we follow Russell in his understanding of both
definite and indefinite descriptions, then there is no need of extending the semantical
framework of first order predicate logic since the semantical conditions for formulas
containing a ρ-term (or a definite description) can be directly read off the righthand
side of (Def ρ).
However, if we wish to to give ρ-terms special semantical considerations, we
outline an approach for doing so. This approach is presented rather informally here:
given a modelM, let A ⊆ dom(M) be the set of objects defined by formula A, and let
B ⊆ dom(M) be the set defined by formula B. Intuitively speaking, the operator ρ
picks out one element in A that is also in B (assuming that their intersection is non-
empty). The central conceptual idea underlying this Russellian account of indefinites
is a kind of semantic context dependency, that is the fact that the specification of
an A-representative picked out by the operator depends on the particular sentential
context in which formula A occurs. In terms of the informal semantics underlying
the ρ-operator, this point is given by the constraint that the selection of a particular
ρ-representative of set A is specified only relative to a given ‘context’ set B in which
the ρ-representative also occurs. Thus, in a slogan, one can say that the reference
of a given term is a function of its particular sentential context. Clearly, this only
works if neither A nor B is empty. In the case that A is empty, one could think of a
solution familiar from the treatment of definite descriptions as done by Carnap. In
this case we would require a chosen object which is by fiat in the extension of every
predicate.
4 Russell and Hilbert indefinites
The relationship between Hilbert’s and Russell’s accounts of indefinite descriptions
can be studied in a precise way by comparing the two underlying logics and their
respective term-forming operators. In particular, it can be shown that the two logical
representations of “An A is a B” in terms of an epsilon and a rho operator do not
coincide.14 Thus, given two first-order formulas A,B, we can show that:
B(εxA(x)) = B(ρxA(x))
14The following discussion follows closely the presentation of this result in [13].
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Proof sketch: To see that the left-to-right implication does not hold, consider a
model M where A = ∅ as well as a choice-function δ interpreting the ε-operator
such that δ(A) ∈ B. Relative to M and δ, the antecedent will turn out true.
However, the consequent will be false given that A ∩ B = ∅. It follows from this
that ∃x(A(x) ∧ B(x)) is false and therefore also the right-hand side of the above
equivalence. In order to show the right-to-left direction to be non-valid, consider a
model where A ∩ B 6= ∅ and A 6⊆ B. Consider a choice function interpreting the
ε-operator such that δ(A) = x /∈ B. The right hand side formula will clearly be true
in this model. Nevertheless, the epsilon formula on the left-hand side will be false
relative to the particular choice function δ.15
This shows that Hilbert and Russell indefinites are not identical. The main
conceptual reason for this fact lies in their different semantic nature. As we saw,
Hilbert indefinites are characterized by a specific mode of reference, that is, by the
fact that the terms representing such indefinites refer arbitrarily to objects in the
domain. The indefinite nature of such terms is thus best explained in terms of their
arbitrary reference. By contrast, indefiniteness in Russell’s sense primarily means
non-uniqueness of reference (in opposition to his account of definite descriptions).
Moreover, another central semantic feature of ρ-terms is, as we saw, the fact that
their reference is not specified in isolation, but contextually, that is, relative to a
given sentential context. This semantic context dependency is clearly missing in the
choice semantic treatment of the extensional ε-logic presented in Section 2. As we
saw above, the semantic value of an epsilon term is specified in a model relative to a
specific choice function. Given such a choice-functional interpretation, the semantic
value of εxA(x) remains stable under changes of sentential contexts in which the
term might occur.
The question remains whether Russell’s and Hilbert’s accounts of indefinite de-
scriptions, if expressed by means of rho-terms and epsilon-terms respectively, are
inter-translatable. The answer to this is positive. In fact, we will present two differ-
ent ways in which Russell’s account of indefinite descriptions can be expressed in a
language containing an epsilon operator.
4.1 Russell indefinites in EC
The first way to translate the Russellian account of definition descriptions into ep-
silon logic is based on the classical language of epsilon terms outlined in section 2.
Recall that first-order predicate logic can be embedded into EC based on a trans-
lation function specified above. Given that RC is embeddable in predicate logic, it
follows that RC must also be interpretable in (classical) EC. In particular, we can
15Compare, again, [13] for a discussion of this result.
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translate the ρ-term representation of the indefinite description “An A is a B” into
a quantifier-free statement of Lε of the following from:
B(ρxA(x))↔ (∃x(A(x) ∧B(x)))ε
↔ A(εx(A(x) ∧B(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
e1
) ∧B(εx(A(x) ∧B(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
e1
)
Intuitively speaking, the context dependency of the Russell indefinite is reflected
here on the right-hand side by the epsilon term built from the conjunction of for-
mulas A(x) and B(x). One could say that context dependency of the semantic
interpretation of the ρ-term in the sentential context B(ρxA(x)) is internalized here
in a more complex ε-term. Notice, moreover, the defining formula on the right-hand
side contains two identical epsilon terms εx(A(x)∧ (B(x)).16 The fact that the term
occurs in both conjuncts on the right-hand side is central for the translation of Rus-
sell indefinite descriptions into EC. Put differently, it can easily be shown that the
weaker equivalence statement
B(ρxA(x))↔ B(εx(A(x) ∧B(x)))
is not generally true. To see this, consider a model in which A∩B = ∅ and a choice
function δ interpreting the ε-operator such that δ(A∩B) ∈ B. (The choice function
picks out an arbitrary member of the model domain here that happens to be in B.).
The right-hand side of the formula would then be true, but the left-hand side would
clearly be false (by definition of the ρ-operator). Counterexamples of this form are
explicitly ruled out in the above stronger equivalence statement by the fact that any
possible semantic value of the term εx(A(x)∧B(x)) is forced to be a member of both
A and B if the right-hand side of formula is to be true.
4.2 Russell indefinites in indexed EC
While the translation of Russell’s indefinite descriptions in the classical language of
extensional EC is somewhat cumbersome, it turns out that they can be formulated
in a natural extension of it, namely in a language of indexed epsilon terms. Indexed
epsilon terms have been subject to recent investigation, both in the logical and
semantic literature.17
16Thus, for this simple example of indefinite descriptions we do not have to concern us here with
nested epsilon terms and the rank and degree of epsilon terms. See [10] for further details on this
topic.
17Such ε-terms were first discussed in work by Egli and von Heusinger (e.g. [4], [16]) and
subsequently (more systematically) by Mints & Sarenac in [9].
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Roughly, the language Lεi of an indexed epsilon-calculus (IEC) contains ε-operators
εix indexed by context variables i, j, . . . or context constants c, c′, . . . . If A(x) is a
formula with a free variable x, and i a context variable, then εixA(x) is a term of
the language. The context variables occurring in such a term can also be bound by
existential and universal quantifiers and allow the formulation of sentences such as
∃i∃jB(εixA(x), εjxA(x)).18 Intuitively speaking, the context-indices of an epsilon-
symbol represent different contexts (or situations) in which the ε-term may occur.
The epsilon operator thus picks out one particular A-representative relative to a
particular context i, and possibly a different object relative to another context j.
This context variability can be expressed semantically in terms of indexed choice
functions that are intended to represent such contexts.
The semantic interpretation of Lεi differs from that of Lε only in one point.19
In the case of classical epsilon terms, choice functions interpreting the ε-operator
are considered as external to a model. In the case of indexed epsilon terms, a
family of possible choice functions is incorporated in the model. A choice structure
interpreting Lεi is thus a triple M = 〈D, I,F〉 where D and I are interpreted as
before and F is a non-empty set of choice functions. As pointed out in [9], one can
understand the context variables of an ε-operator as ranging over this collection of
choice functions. An assignment function s on M then maps individual variables to
elements in the domain D and context variables to elements in F. A valuation rule
for indexed ε-terms can then be specified analogously to the above case:20
valM,s(εixA(x)) = s(i)({d ∈ D |M, s[x/d] |= A(x)}),
where s(i) ∈ F.
A number of axioms have been introduced in [9] to describe the logical behaviour
of indexed epsilon terms. These contain, in particular, the following variants of the
axioms of classical EC:
A(t)→ A(εaxA(x)), with a a context term. (Critical formulas)
∀x(A(x)↔ B(x))→ ∀i(εixA(x) = εixB(x)) (Extensionality)
ϕ[i/a]→ ∃iϕ, with a and i context terms. (EI for context variables)
The second axiom of extensionality states that equivalent formulas have the same
ε-representative in all possible contexts. The third axiom states that if a formula
18Quantifiers can be defined in the language of indexed epsilon terms in a number of equivalent
ways. For instance, the existential quantifier can be specified by ∃xA(x) :↔ ∃iA(εixA(x)) or by
∃xA(x) :↔ ∀iA(εixA(x)). See [9, p.619].
19The following discussion is based on the presentation given in [9].
20See again [9] for a more detailed presentation.
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contains an epsilon term with a context constant a, then a can be substituted by an
existentially bound context variable i.21
Russell’s indefinite descriptions turn out to be embeddable in the language of
IEC. In particular, it can be shown that the following equivalence holds:22
B(ρxA(x))↔ ∃x(A(x)) ∧ ∃iB(εixA(x))
The right hand side of the formula states that (i) set A is nonempty and (ii) there
exists at least one context in which the element picked out from A by the corre-
sponding choice function also lives in set B. This is precisely the claim also expressed
on the left hand side of the formula. Thus, both sides are true if and only if there
exists an element in the intersection of A and B. A proof of this theorem can be
given in a combined indexed epsilon and rho-calculus:
Proof sketch: Consider first the left-to-right direction: assume B(ρxA(x)). Then,
by definition (Def ρ), it follows that ∃x(A(x) ∧B(x)) and therefore also ∃xA(x). A
theorem in IEC is ∃x(A(x)∧B(x))→ ∃iB(εixA(x)) (see [9, p.622]) Together, these
results give us B(ρxA(x))→ ∃x(A(x)) ∧ ∃iB(εixA(x)).
The other direction follows directly from another theorem in IEC, namely ∃x(A(x))∧
∃iB(εix(A(x)))→ ∃x(A(x) ∧B(x)) and (Def ρ) (see again [9, p.622]).
This result shows that Russell’s account of indefinite descriptions (and the con-
textual principle of indefinites implicit in it) can also be represented in terms of
Hilbert’s epsilon terms if one allows the generalization of the language of EC to
include context indices. The main reason for this is that the extended language of
IEC allows one to capture also syntactically (that is, by means of context variables
and context quantifiers) the kind of semantic context sensitivity that is already ex-
pressible metatheoretically for standard EC in terms of the quantification over choice
functions.23
21Given this choice semantics, Mints & Sarenac also present a Henkin-style proof of the com-
pleteness of IEC. It should be noted here that Hans Leiß (LMU Munich) has recently argued in his
talk at EPSILON2015 in Montpellier that the completeness proof in [9] may contain a gap. He has
also suggested that a completeness theorem can be proven if context equality in IEC is dropped.
See [7] for further details.
22The stronger and, arguably, more intuitive equivalence B(ρxA(x)) ↔ ∃iB(εixA(x)) does not
hold. One can think of a model with A = ∅ and an assignment of choice function δ to variable i
such that δ(A) ∈ B. It follows that ∃iB(εixA(x)) is true and B(ρxA(x)) is false.
23This point has first been stressed by von Heusinger with respect to indefinite noun phrases. As
he puts it, IEC allows a “a uniform representation of indefinite [noun phrases] by means of indexed
epsilon terms” [16, 261].
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5 Conclusion
What did we achieve in this paper? We presented two accounts of indefinite descrip-
tions. The first one was based on Hilbert’s ε-terms, the second one was Russell’s
account of indefinite descriptions formulated here in terms of what we coined ρ-
terms. Both accounts can be seen as formal investigations of indefinites. There
are, however, significant differences between them. In the case of Hilbert’s epsilon
terms, the indeterminacy comes from the inherent understanding of ε-terms them-
selves; a fact that relates directly to the semantic conditions outlined in section 2.
In the semantic framework that we have outlined here (i.e. a semantics based on
choice functions), the reference of an ε-term is always ensured even if the predicate
on which the ε-term depends on is empty. We then related this choice-functional
treatment of epsilon logic to a notion from the philosophy of language, namely arib-
trary reference; we claimed that this type of undetermined reference to objects is
characteristic for Hilbert’s understanding of ε-terms as indefinite expressions.
The second approach described in the paper was in the spirit of Russell’s con-
ception of indefinite descriptions. The semantic indeterminacy of Russell indefinites
can be qualified in two ways: (a) as we have said in section 3, Russell’s account of
ambiguous descriptions can be seen as a restriction of his view of definite descrip-
tions (simply be dropping the uniqueness condition). Interesting here is the fact that
indeterminacy enters by its formal interpretation of formulas containing ρ-terms as
existentially quantified sentences. However, there is more, i.e. (b) there is also a
context dependency which is expressed by the fact that indefinite descriptions have
to occur in a certain context, otherwise they would be meaningless – we are follow-
ing here Russell’s doctrine of incomplete symbols. Semantically speaking, there is no
real need to extend the usual framework of first order predicate logic. Nonetheless,
we have discussed a possibly promising alternative semantical route briefly. A more
considerate model-theoretic study of ρ-terms will be subject to future research.
We have then addressed the question concerning interrelations between the two
approaches. As was pointed out, there is no direct connection between these two
calculi. If we, however, employ the (.)ε-translation (outlined in section 2) to the
righthand side of (Def. ρ) we have found that there is a connection of two formal
approaches after all. Another interconnection between Hilbert and Russell indef-
inites has been established by exploiting the fact that Russell’s indefinites always
rely on some (sentential) context. This was the main thought behind why we have
chosen to turn to an indexed ε-calculus for the representation of Russell’s ambiguous
descriptions. The indexed ε-calculus has the syntactical means to express both the
context dependency of Russell’s indefinites (by hand of an index) and furthermore
allows us to quantify over indices which is possible in Hilbert’s ε-calculus only on
Gratzl and Schiemer
the semantic side.
The present paper contains a philosophical outline of a rather formal investiga-
tion of Russell and Hilbert indefinites. A more rigorous presentation of the material
covered here will have to be given in a future paper.
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